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Abstract
In a dynamic storable good market where demand changes over time, we investigate the
producer’s strategic incentives to hold inventories in response to the possibility of buyer
stockpiling. The literature on storable goods has demonstrated that buyer stockpiling in
anticipation of higher future prices harms the producer’s profitability, particularly when the
producer cannot commit to future prices. We show that the producer’s inventories act as
a strategic device to mitigate the loss from the lack of commitment. Our results provide a
rationale for the producer’s inventory behavior that sheds new light on the well-documented
empirical evidence about inventories.
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1 Introduction
Inventory management is essential for a firm’s viability in many industries. Although the share
of inventory investment in the gross domestic product (GDP) is relatively small, changes in
inventories are a significant component of economic fluctuations. During the recent financial
crisis, the reduction in inventories accounted for 29% of the decline in GDP (Wang et al. 2014).
Traditional reasons for inventories are driven by technological features, such as production
smoothing over time in the presence of convex production costs and stockout avoidance when
production takes time and cannot be immediately adjusted to demand shocks (e.g., Aguirre-
gabiria 1999; Anupindi et al. 2012; Arrow et al. 1951; Arvan and Moses 1982; Holdt et al. 1960;
Kahn 1987; Krishnan and Winter 2007, 2010; Nahmias 2008; Zipkin 2000). The empirical evi-
dence indicates that inventories are procyclical and production is more variable than sales (e.g.,
Blanchard 1983; Blinder 1986; Ramey and West 1999; Wen 2005). Information about the pro-
duction and inventory activities is generally available in industry reports, financial statements
as well as balance sheets. Such information is also collected in accurate databases. For instance,
Standard & Poor’s Compustat has provided since 1962 financial, statistical and market data
about companies throughout the world.1
The presence of intermediaries and arbitrageurs in the commodity markets reveals that buy-
ers also exhibit incentives to store. A recent strand of the empirical literature has systematically
documented buyer stockpiling in anticipation of higher future prices in markets for various in-
termediate and final goods (e.g., Erdem et al. 2003; Hall and Rust 2000; Hendel and Nevo 2004,
2006a, 2006b; Pesendorfer 2002).
The storage activities of firms and their customers have been examined separately in the
literature so far. In this paper, we provide a unified framework in order to investigate the
inventory behavior of a producer vis-a`-vis forward-looking buyers that are willing to store in
anticipation of higher future prices. Abstracting from the aforementioned classical reasons for
inventories, we show that a producer unable to commit to future prices has a strategic incentive
to hold inventories when facing the prospect of buyer stockpiling. Our results provide theoretical
support for the main stylized facts about the firms’ inventory activities.
We focus our attention on storable goods, which are perishable in consumption but can
be stored for future consumption. Typical examples are various intermediate goods (e.g., oil,
coffee and wheat) and groceries that can be purchased in advance and stored. In order to
characterize the strategic role of the producer’s inventories, we build on the seminal paper of
Dudine et al. (2006), which considers a dynamic storable good market with deterministic time-
varying demand where a monopolistic producer cannot commit to future prices and faces a
continuum of competitive buyers available to stockpile in anticipation of higher future prices.
Dudine et al. (2006) show that the excessively high future prices driven by the producer’s
lack of commitment trigger buyer stockpiling, which is ex ante profit detrimental in that it
reduces future sales occurring at a higher price. As a result of wasteful buyer stockpiling,
profits and welfare are lower than under full commitment. In this setting, we introduce the
possibility for the firm to accumulate production in the form of inventories available for future
1Information about the 100 largest companies traded on the US stock exchanges can be regularly found at
https://www.stock-analysis-on.net.
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sales. To fix ideas, consider the oil market in the US, where a large oil producer (or refiner)
generally supplies competitive distributors (or directly the petrol stations) and accumulates
some quantity in its depositories to cover future demand. The distributors (and petrol stations)
are also endowed with storage capacities. In many other markets for storable goods – such as
bananas, bauxite, coffee, copper, diamonds, iron ore, mercury, phosphates, and tin – supply
is relatively concentrated, with some producers possessing large market power. Competitive
speculators trade these goods and engage in stockpiling activities.2
In our framework, production costs are linear and do not vary over time, while demand
evolves deterministically. Therefore, there is no scope for the aforementioned well-documented
motives for inventories, and the producer shall engage in inventory activities only for strategic
purposes. Under full commitment, the producer does not benefit from inventories, since it can
credibly announce a price sequence that removes buyer stockpiling and inventories would only
result in a mere loss due to their holding costs. However, this conclusion is no longer valid when
the producer is unable to commit to future prices, and inventories can emerge in equilibrium.3 To
understand the rationale for this result, it is important to realize that inventories are produced
in the first period and their cost is sunk once the second period has commenced. A producer
that cannot commit to future prices holds inventories as a strategic device to reduce future
costs, which translates into lower future prices and mitigates the buyer stockpiling incentives.
We find that under certain circumstances, despite the lack of commitment, the producer
accumulates the amount of inventories that maximizes the ex ante profits, and the constraint
of sequential optimality is slack in equilibrium. As under full commitment, buyer stockpiling
is removed, with the only additional cost of holding inventories. Notably, this solution is im-
plementable only if the unit cost of production is large enough. Prima facie, this might seem
counterintuitive, since one could expect that a more efficient producer finds inventories more
attractive. The rationale for this result arises from the strategic nature of inventories. Each
level of inventories is associated with a second period price at which they are fully exhausted.
When the cost of production is large enough, the ex ante optimal level of inventories is relatively
small and in the second period the producer does not succumb to the temptation to discard
some inventories and to set a price above the level at which inventories are fully sold. Moreover,
as long as the cost of holding inventories is relatively small, the firm does not have any incentive
to produce some additional quantity in the second period, either. Additional production would
be clearly suboptimal, since producing the entire quantity in the second period allows the firm
to avoid the cost of holding inventories. Given that the producer shall charge the second period
price at which inventories are fully exhausted, the ex ante optimal inventory level is also se-
quentially optimal. Anticipating a lower future price associated with the sunkness of inventory
costs, buyers abstain from any stockpiling activity. Therefore, inventories constitute a strategic
device to mitigate the producer’s loss from the lack of commitment. In particular, as long as
holding inventories is costless, the full commitment outcome is restored.
If the unit cost of production is small enough, the ex ante optimal level of inventories is
2Governments can also implement stockpiling policies, especially in order to protect against future supply
disruptions (e.g., Nichols and Zeckhauser 1977).
3As discussed in Section 7.3, the introduction of forward or futures contracts cannot restore the full commit-
ment solution.
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relatively large and in the second period the producer cannot refrain from discarding a portion
of the inventories accumulated in the first period and setting a second period price above the
level at which inventories are fully sold. In other words, the ex ante optimal level of inventories
is not sequentially optimal and cannot be sustained in equilibrium. We show that, even in
this case, inventories can play a strategic role in mitigating the buyer stockpiling incentives. It
follows from our previous discussion that inventories must be distorted away from the ex ante
optimal level, and the constraint of sequential optimality is binding in equilibrium. As a result,
both the producer and the buyers may now engage in storing activities.
When the cost of production is relatively large and therefore the ex ante optimal inventory
level is also sequentially optimal, inventories generally lead to lower prices although they involve
holding costs. The rationale for this apparently surprising result stems from the strategic
nature of inventories, which mitigate the producer’s temptation to increase future prices and
curb the buyer stockpiling incentives. Hence, despite being used in the producer’s private
interest, inventories increase consumer surplus and social welfare. This conclusion deserves
some qualifications when the cost of production is relatively small and therefore the equilibrium
inventory level departs from the ex ante optimal level. As described in Section 5, the comparisons
between equilibrium prices are driven by the demand curvature and the inventory cost in a non-
trivial manner. Equilibrium prices exhibit peculiar features that merit some attention. For
instance, we show in Sections 4 and 5 that a lower inventory cost may lead to higher prices.
Our paper provides a novel strategic rationale for the firms’ inventory activities, which does
not lie in the specific production technologies assumed by the traditional inventory theories.
The predictions of our model lend themselves to an empirically testable validation and can
stimulate the empirical or experimental investigation on the firms’ inventory management. A
relevant market where our results can be applied is the oil market, which exhibits relatively
large costs of production and small inventory costs. In 2015, with a crude oil price of around
48 dollars per barrel, in the US the oil production costs were 36 dollars per barrel, while the
inventory costs only amounted to about 0.5 dollars per barrel.4
Our results also shed new light on the empirical evidence about inventories discussed at
the beginning. In particular, since strategic inventories are associated with periods of demand
expansion, we establish microfoundations for the well-documented observation of inventory pro-
cyclicality. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 7.1, inventories are more likely to emerge in
the presence of higher degrees of market concentration or product differentiation. Interestingly,
this provides theoretical corroboration for the empirical evidence documented by Amihud and
Mendelson (1989) that firms with greater market power hold a larger level of inventories. An
additional, more theoretical, implication of our model is that the normalization of production
costs to zero usually adopted in the literature is not innocuous in storable good markets, since
it undermines the firms’ strategic inventory incentives.
Our investigation is conducted in a fairly general setting without imposing any unduly re-
strictive assumptions on the functional forms. The analysis in Section 7 reveals that the model
is robust and the driving force of our results persists in alternative scenarios, such as competi-
tion among producers or a higher number of periods. Although our model is deterministic in
4Further details are available at https://www.rystadenergy.com.
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the spirit of Dudine et al. (2006), our results can be easily generalized to a setting where de-
mand evolves stochastically over time.5 As argued in Section 8, our results provide potentially
significant managerial, empirical and policy implications.
Related literature There exists a recent fast-growing literature on strategic inventories in
markets for storable goods. Anand et al. (2008) show that in a dynamic buyer-seller rela-
tionship the buyer uses strategic inventories to induce the seller to decrease its future price.
Extending the model of Anand et al. (2008), Arya and Mittendorf (2013) investigate the role
of consumer rebates in the presence of strategic inventories, while Arya et al. (2015) find that
strategic inventories influence the choice between centralization and decentralization. Hartwig
et al. (2015) provide experimental support for strategic inventories. Differently from these
contributions, we investigate the producer’s inventory strategic incentives that arise from the
possibility of buyer stockpiling.
It has been recognized long ago in the economic literature that a firm can benefit from
the investment in capacities or inventories as an irreversible commitment against the rivals
(e.g., Arvan 1985; Dixit 1980; Driver 2000; Mollgaard et al. 2000; Saloner 1986; Ware 1985).
Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) identify inventories as a means to sustain collusion. Deneckere et
al. (1996) show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive
retail market may wish to support an adequate level of retail inventories. More recently, Mitraille
and Moreaux (2013) consider a dynamic setting where Cournot competitors, after storing in
the first period, may produce and sell in the second period.
As previously discussed, one of the most relevant papers in the literature on buyer stockpiling
is Dudine et al. (2006). Hendel et al. (2014) extend the analysis to nonlinear pricing of storable
goods. Other important contributions deserve consideration. Anton and Das Varma (2005)
show in a Cournot setting that, when buyers are sufficiently patient, competition among firms
to attract buyer stockpiling generates an increasing price path.6 Guo and Villas-Boas (2007)
find that in a differentiated good market the preference heterogeneity translates into differential
buyer stockpiling propensity, which exacerbates future price competition and may remove buyer
stockpiling in equilibrium. Su (2010) incorporates buyer stockpiling into Su (2007)’s analysis
of the optimal dynamic strategy of a seller that faces strategic buyers. Differently from our
approach, the seller’s inventories are carried for standard reasons such as economies of scale
and do not have any strategic role. Hendel and Nevo (2013) investigate intertemporal price
discrimination when buyers differ in their storage abilities.
Our paper also pertains to the vast literature on durable goods, which share some similarities
with storable goods, as Dudine et al. (2006) point out. Among others, two relevant recent
contributions are Board (2008), which solves the profit maximization problem of a durable good
monopolist with time-varying demand, and Garrett (2016), which addresses the same problem
in a setting where buyers arrive over time and have values for the good that evolve stochastically.
While these studies are interested in the classical problem of demand postponement, we focus
5For instance, a shock may affect the expectation about future demand. The stochastic process may follow a
mean reversion pattern, similarly to Antoniou et al. (2017). In Section 8 we discuss the implications of allowing
for uncertain demand.
6Section 7.1 describes the relation between our paper and Anton and Das Varma (2005) and Mitraille and
Moreaux (2013).
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on demand anticipation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the formal model. Section
3 identifies three relevant benchmarks: the producer’s static problem, the producer’s dynamic
problem under full commitment, and the producer’s dynamic problem under limited commit-
ment in the absence of inventories. Section 4 shows the main results of the paper about the
producer’s strategic incentives to hold inventories under limited commitment. Section 5 inves-
tigates price comparisons. Section 6 provides a full characterization of the results with explicit
functions. Section 7 discusses the robustness of the model and explores different extensions.
Section 8 concludes and illustrates some managerial, empirical and policy implications. The
main formal proofs are collected in the Appendix. Additional formal results and associated
proofs are relegated to the Supplementary Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Setting
Buyers We consider a two-period monopoly market for a storable good where in each period
τ ∈ {1, 2} the producer faces a (continuously differentiable) demand Dτ (pτ ), which decreases
with the price pτ , i.e., Dτ |τ < 0.
7 In line with Dudine et al. (2006), the demand changes
deterministically over time and, as it will be clear in the sequel, we are mainly interested in
the case where the demand rises in the second period. For the sake of simplicity, there is no
discounting on the second period. In Section 7.4 we discuss the role of the discount factor.
The producer serves a continuum of competitive buyers, which operate as arbitrageurs in
the market and purchase the good from the producer in order to resell it to the final consumers
at zero profits. Therefore, the buyer demand corresponds to the final consumer demand. Buyers
can purchase in advance and stockpile the good in the first period at a unit cost sb > 0.
8
Denoting by pe2 the expected price in the second period, the buyer stockpiling demand writes
as
Ds (p1) =

D2 (p1 + sb) if p1 + sb < p
e
2
[0, D2 (p1 + sb)] if p1 + sb = p
e
2
0 if p1 + sb > p
e
2
(1)
If p1 + sb < p
e
2, the first period price inflated by the buyer stockpiling cost is smaller than the
second period expected price, and therefore buyers prefer to purchase in advance and stockpile
the good. Conversely, if p1 + sb > p
e
2, buyer stockpiling is strictly dominated. If p1 + sb = p
e
2,
buyers are indifferent between stockpiling or not. Under buyer rational expectations and perfect
foresight (no uncertainty), the second period expected price coincides with the second period
equilibrium price.9
7The subscript τ on the right of the slash denotes the derivative with respect to the price pτ and the subscript
ττ identifies the second-order derivative with respect to pτ . We follow this notation throughout the paper.
8Our results are unaffected when the producer directly faces the final consumers. Note that the arbitrageurs,
whose presence is also suggested by Dudine et al. (2006), are more likely to have lower stockpiling costs and
superior information about the producer. We refer to Section 2.2 for further details.
9As mentioned in the introduction, our qualitative results carry over under demand uncertainty. In Section 8
we provide additional discussion on this point.
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Producer In each period the producer decides on the amount of production and the level of
sales, or equivalently the price for the good. Let c ≥ 0 be the (constant) unit cost of produc-
tion.10 The quantity produced net of the current sales represents the producer’s inventories,
which are available for sale in the following period. Since the game consists of two periods,
it is straightforward to see that both the producer and the buyers do not store in the second
period. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the producer’s inventories and buyer stockpiling
in the first period. Let I ≥ 0 be the producer’s first period inventory level available for sale
in the second period, which involves a unit inventory cost sp ≥ 0. We assume that sp ≤ sb.
This reflects the natural idea that the producer is more efficient at storing than the buyers and
captures the most relevant case for our purposes.11
The producer’s aggregate profits are Π = Π1 + Π2, where
Π1 = (p1 − c) [D1 (p1) +Ds (p1)]− (c+ sp) I (2)
and
Π2 = p2 [D2 (p2)−Ds (p1)]− c [D2 (p2)−Ds (p1)− I] · 1Q2 (3)
denote the profits in the first and second period, respectively. The indicator function 1Q2 in (3)
assumes value 1 if production takes place in the second period, i.e., D2 (p2)−Ds (p1)−I > 0, and
value zero otherwise. The buyer stockpiling demand Ds (p1) increases the demand in the first
period but depresses it in the second period. The aggregate cost (c+ sp) per unit of inventory is
incurred by the producer in the first period and therefore it is a sunk cost in the second period.
The producer’s profits Πτ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, satisfy the following standard assumption.
Assumption 1 Πτ |ττ < 0, τ ∈ {1, 2}.
This ensures that the producer’s profits Πτ are concave in the price pτ and the second-order
conditions for profit maximization are fulfilled.
2.2 Timing and equilibrium concept
Each period of the game includes the following two stages.
(I) The producer chooses the amount of production and the price for the good.
(II) Buyers purchase a quantity of the good and decide on the amount to be stockpiled.
The solution concept we adopt is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The difference be-
tween the quantity produced and the sales in each period determines the producer’s inventories
available for sale in the following period. In line with the relevant literature (e.g., Anand et al.
2008; Arvan 1985; Arya et al. 2015; Arya and Mittendorf 2013; Mitraille and Moreaux 2013;
Mollgaard et al. 2000; Krishnan and Winter 2010; Ware 1985), production and inventory deci-
sions are observable and can therefore affect the buyer stockpiling behavior. As discussed in the
10This cost formulation isolates the strategic inventory incentives under investigation and neutralizes further
possible inventory reasons. If we allow for decreasing or increasing economies of scale, the inventory incentives
are magnified by standard technological motives. In the first case, the firm may engage in production smoothing
over time, while in the second case higher production in a given period leads to lower unit costs. A change in
production costs over time also affects the inventory behavior in a predictable manner.
11An alternative interpretation is that the producer attaches a higher weight on the future than the buyers.
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introduction, reliable data about the production and inventory activities are publicly available,
at least for large firms.12 Krishnan and Winter (2010) assume that customers are perfectly in-
formed about the firms’ inventories available for sale and characterize in their expanded working
paper (Krishnan and Winter 2009) the main channels through which this information can be
acquired. For instance, in several markets intermediaries operate to collect information about
a firm’s inventory performance. Moreover, firms often advertise their availability and allow
customers to view inventories online.13
Notably, our results hold even when buyers cannot perfectly observe the firm’s produc-
tion and inventory decisions. Following Mitraille and Moreaux (2013), it is sufficient that the
producer is endowed with a communication technology that signals its actions in a relatively
precise manner (Schelling 1960). The cost of this technology can be captured in our model by
the inventory cost. Signals about the firm’s production and inventory activities can be inferred
from different sources, such as industry reports and midyear financial statements. As Dudine
et al. (2006) suggest, buyers can be thought of as competitive arbitrageurs that should possess
accurate information about the producer’s financial situation.
3 Relevant benchmarks
3.1 Static problem
When buyer stockpiling is not feasible, the producer does not have any interest in holding
inventories. In each period the firm produces the amount of the good that meets the current
buyer demand. Formally, the producer’s problem in period τ ∈ {1, 2} is given by
max
pτ
(pτ − c)Dτ (pτ ) . (4)
Setting τ = 2 in the first-order condition Dτ (pτ ) + (pτ − c)Dτ |τ (pτ ) = 0 yields the following
auxiliary function
φ2(p2) ≡ D2 (p2) + (p2 − c)D2|2 (p2) , (5)
which is helpful for our analysis. The derivative of (5) with respect to p2 is negative, i.e.,
φ2|1 (p2) < 0 (by Assumption 1). The equilibrium static monopoly price in period τ ∈ {1, 2}
is pmτ = c − D
m
τ
Dm
τ |τ
. Note from (1) that for pm1 + sb ≥ pm2 buyers do not exhibit any (strict)
incentive for stockpiling. The producer’s problem is trivial and corresponds to a replica of the
static monopoly problem. In line with Dudine et al. (2006), hereafter we impose the following
assumption, which ensures that the opportunity of buyer stockpiling affects the producer’s
intertemporal pricing problem.
Assumption 2 pm1 + sb < p
m
2 ⇔ sb < D
m
1
Dm
1|1
− Dm2Dm
2|2
.
12For instance Shell, one of the largest oil companies in the world, systematically publishes information about
the production and inventory levels and their variations. Details are available at https://reports.shell.com/annual-
report/2016/servicepages/download-centre.php.
13Yin et al. (2009) provide some evidence about the firms’ inventory disclosure to their customers.
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The buyer stockpiling cost sb must be sufficiently small that buyers prefer to stockpile when
the producer charges the static profit maximizing monopoly price in each period. As sb > 0,
Assumption 2 requires that the demand (for a given slope) grows over time.
3.2 Full commitment
To better appreciate the forces at play under limited commitment, we first consider the case
where the producer is able to commit to a two-period pricing policy (p1, p2). The following
lemma formalizes the equilibrium under full commitment.
Lemma 1 The full commitment equilibrium exhibits the following features:
(i) no producer’s inventories, i.e., Ic = 0;
(ii) no buyer stockpiling, i.e., Dcs = 0;
(iii) prices pc1 = c− D
c
1+φ
c
2
Dc
1|1
and pc2 = p
c
1 + sb, where p
c
1 > p
m
1 and p
c
2 < p
m
2 .
Lemma 1 indicates that the producer prefers to commit to a price sequence that fully removes
buyer stockpiling. To this end, the producer increases the first period price and reduces the
second period price relative to the static monopoly level, i.e., pc1 > p
m
1 and p
c
2 < p
m
2 . The no-
arbitrage constraint is binding, i.e., pc2 = p
c
1 + sb, and buyers pay in the second period the cost
they would incur for stockpiling, which allows the producer to extract the increased surplus.
Indeed, buyers are indifferent between stockpiling or not, but no stockpiling takes place in
equilibrium. This is because the producer could slightly reduce the second period price, which
fully removes buyer stockpiling and yields a discontinuous increase in profits. The possibility of
buyer stockpiling harms the producer, since it cannot equalize marginal revenues and marginal
costs in the two periods. For our purposes, it is important to note that, under full commitment,
inventories are not profitable for the producer, because they involve a mere loss associated with
the inventory costs.
3.3 Limited commitment without inventories
Turning to the case where the producer cannot commit to future prices, the following lemma
establishes the results in the absence of producer’s inventories.
Lemma 2 Under limited commitment, in the absence of producer’s inventories one of the fol-
lowing outcomes arises:
(a) buyer stockpiling, i.e., Dnss = φ
ns
2 , and prices p
ns
1 = c−
Dns1 +φ
ns
2 −sbφns2|1
Dns
1|1
, pns2 = p
ns
1 + sb;
(b) no buyer stockpiling, i.e., Dnns = 0, and prices p
nn
1 = p
nn
2 − sb, pnn2 = pm2 .
Lemma 2 replicates the results of Dudine et al. (2006), where the producer does not engage
in inventory activities.14 Notably, the full commitment outcome is no longer an equilibrium
under limited commitment. To see this, recall from Lemma 1 that the producer finds it optimal
to commit to a second period price below the static monopoly level in order to remove buyer
stockpiling. When the producer cannot commit to future prices, it succumbs to the temptation
14Since we show the results of Dudine et al. (2006) in a manner that better fits our purposes, the proof of
Lemma 2 is included in the Appendix.
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to charge the second period monopoly price if buyers did not store in the first period. An-
ticipating this, buyers are eager to store, and the full commitment outcome is not achievable
anymore. As Lemma 2(a) reveals, buyer stockpiling emerges in equilibrium. This outcome
occurs when the demand in the second period is relatively high or buyer stockpiling is not too
costly. To mitigate buyer stockpiling, the producer sets the price in the first period above the
full commitment level. Since the no-arbitrage constraint is binding, the price exceeds the full
commitment level in the second period as well. The buyer eagerness not to be exploited by the
producer leads to higher prices. Buyers are indifferent to the quantity stored in equilibrium, and
buyer stockpiling is endogenously determined by taking into account the producer’s response.
As Lemma 2(b) indicates, when the demand growth is less pronounced or the buyer stock-
piling cost is large enough, buyer stockpiling does not take place in equilibrium, although the
no-arbitrage constraint is still binding. The price in the second period is set at the static
monopoly level but the price in the first period is distorted upward (by Assumption 2). In line
with Lemma 2(a), prices are higher than under full commitment in both periods.
4 Strategic inventories
We are now in a position to address the main issue of this paper and investigate the producer’s
incentives to hold inventories under limited commitment. Since the producer’s inventories cor-
respond to the difference between the quantity produced and the current sales, the producer’s
problem reduces to the choice of the price per period and the inventory level. Formally, using
(2) and (3), we have
max
p1,I
(p1 − c) [D1 (p1) +Ds (p1)]− (c+ sp) I
+ p2 [D2 (p2)−Ds (p1)]− c [D2 (p2)−Ds (p1)− I] · 1Q2 (6)
subject to the following constraint of sequential optimality
p2 (Ds (p1) , I) ≡ arg max
p˜2
p˜2 [D2 (p˜2)−Ds (p1)]− c [D2 (p˜2)−Ds (p1)− I] · 1Q2 . (7)
The relevant feature of the producer’s problem is the interdependence of the choice variables
across periods. Similarly to the setting of Dudine et al. (2006) described in Lemma 2, the first
period price p1 can influence the second period profits through the buyer stockpiling demand
Ds in (1). The innovative aspect of our framework is the possibility that the producer engages
in inventory activities. The producer accumulates inventories in the first period, which are
available for sale in the second period. Inventories affect the producer’s aggregate profits through
two channels. A first effect of inventories arises from the fact that the aggregate inventory costs
are incurred in the first period and therefore they are sunk in the second period. A second,
more subtle, effect of inventories – that we investigate in the sequel – is their impact on the
buyer behavior and specifically on the buyer stockpiling demand in equilibrium.
In our parsimonious model with constant marginal costs, the producer’s choice of the inven-
tory level reduces to a binary decision. Either the producer abstains from holding inventories
at all, i.e., I = 0, or it accumulates the amount of inventories that covers the second period
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demand net of buyer stockpiling, i.e., I = D2 −Ds, which drives the producer’s second period
costs to zero. Any production in the second period in addition to inventories would entail a
marginal cost equal to c, which translates into a price at the static second period monopoly
level. Anticipating this, the firm would prefer to produce the whole quantity in the second
period and to avoid the inventory costs. Clearly, any inventory level above the second period
(net) demand is also suboptimal.
We know from Lemma 1 that inventories are not profitable for a producer with full commit-
ment powers. However, when the producer cannot commit to future prices, it succumbs to the
temptation to adjust the price in the second period in response to the buyer stockpiling behav-
ior. In the following proposition, we characterize the producer’s incentives to hold inventories
as a strategic device to mitigate the loss from the lack of commitment.
Proposition 1 Suppose c ≥ c˜, where c˜ is defined by (11) in the Appendix. Then, under limited
commitment, there exists a threshold s˜p > 0 for the inventory cost such that for sp ≤ s˜p the
limited commitment equilibrium exhibits the following features:
(i) producer’s inventories, i.e., I∗ = D∗2;
(ii) no buyer stockpiling, i.e., D∗s = 0;
(iii) prices p∗1 = c−
D∗1+φ
∗
2−spD∗2|1
D∗
1|1
and p∗2 = p∗1 + sb.
For sp = 0, the full commitment outcome is restored.
Proposition 1 indicates that under certain circumstances the producer benefits from using
inventories for strategic purposes. The amount of inventories covers the second period demand
and maximizes the producer’s ex ante profits in (6), ignoring the constraint of sequential op-
timality in (7). In the light of the producer’s lack of commitment, this inventory strategy can
be sustained in equilibrium only if selling exactly the ex ante optimal amount of inventories
maximizes the second period profits, namely, it is sequentially optimal. Put differently, the
producer must not have any incentive to revise its decision and to sell in the second period a
quantity that differs from the inventory level.
The solution in Proposition 1 is implementable when the cost of production c is above the
threshold c˜ defined by (11) in the Appendix, where c˜ > 0 for values of the inventory cost sp
small enough (by Assumption 2). Prima facie, this could seem counterintuitive, since one might
expect that a high cost of production undermines the desirability of inventories. The rationale
for this result stems from the strategic nature of inventories under limited commitment. In the
extreme case where c = 0, the producer cannot refrain from charging a second period price
at which marginal revenues fall to zero, irrespective of the amount of inventories. For c > 0,
inventories are potentially beneficial, since they reduce the second period costs, which translates
into a lower second period price and mitigates the buyer stockpiling incentives.
As Figure 1 illustrates, any ex ante optimal inventory level I∗ such that D2 (pm2 ) ≤ I∗ =
D∗2 ≤ D2 (pm2 |c=0 ) maximizes the second period profits as well. In other terms, the constraint
of sequential optimality is slack in equilibrium. As formally shown in the proof of Proposition
1 in the Appendix, when the cost of production is relatively large, i.e., c ≥ c˜, the second period
price at which inventories are fully exhausted is higher than the monopoly price at zero costs,
i.e., p∗2 ≥ pm2 |c=0 . A price increase from p∗2 results in a mere loss, since the marginal revenue at
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Figure 1: Strategic inventories
I∗ = D∗2 ≤ D2 (pm2 |c=0 ) is positive and therefore the lower sales due to a higher price reduce
the producer’s revenues, while costs remain at zero. The idea is that a sufficiently large cost of
production curbs the amount of inventories so that the producer does not have any incentive to
raise its price in the second period and to discard some inventories. Moreover, for p∗2 ≤ pm2 the
inventory level I∗ = D∗2 ≥ D2 (pm2 ) is such that the marginal cost c of the additional production
associated with a price reduction from p∗2 outweighs the corresponding marginal revenue. Hence,
in the second period the producer does not have any incentive to reduce its price from the level
p∗2 at which inventories are fully exhausted. We know from Lemma 1 that the second period
price under full commitment is below the static monopoly level, i.e., pc2 < p
m
2 . Since p
∗
2 = p
c
2
for sp = 0, we have that p
∗
2 ≤ pm2 when sp is small enough. Consequently, for c ≥ c˜ the full
commitment outcome in Lemma 1 can be replicated under limited commitment when holding
inventories is costless, i.e., sp = 0. In other terms, the producer is able to allocate the ex ante
optimal quantity in the second period at no additional cost. By continuity, as long as sp is
sufficiently small, the producer shall have incentives to hold inventories, although this generates
a price distortion above the full commitment level.
Since buyers anticipate that the producer will not revise its price relative to the level at which
inventories are fully exhausted and their cost is sunk in the second period, inventories act as a
strategic device to credibly reduce future prices. This weakens the buyer stockpiling incentives
and mitigates the producer’s loss from the lack of commitment.15 In order to deal with buyer
stockpiling, the producer resorts to inventories as a complementary instrument to prices, which
is perfect as long as holding inventories is costless. As mentioned in the introduction, the oil
market is a particularly suitable example for our purposes, since it exhibits relatively large costs
of production and negligible inventory costs.
Given that the no-arbitrage constraint is binding, buyers are indeed indifferent to storing.
As under full commitment, no buyer stockpiling occurs in equilibrium, since a slight rise in
the first period price fully removes buyer stockpiling while preserving sequential optimality,
which yields a discontinuous increase in profits (the constraint of sequential optimality is slack
in equilibrium). A similar result would obtain with a slight rise in the producer’s inventories,
which translates into a lower second period price.
15It follows from our previous discussion that introducing a cost at which the producer can discard or destroy
its inventories would reinforce this result.
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As shown in Figure 1, any ex ante optimal inventory level I∗ such that either I∗ < D2 (pm2 ) or
I∗ > D2 (pm2 |c=0 ) is not sequentially optimal and cannot be sustained in equilibrium. When the
cost of production is relatively small, i.e., c < c˜, the second period price at which inventories are
fully exhausted is lower than the monopoly price at zero costs, i.e., p∗2 < pm2 |c=0 . The inventory
level I∗ > D2 (pm2 |c=0 ) is excessive from the second period perspective, since it entails negative
marginal revenues. The producer succumbs to the temptation to increase the second period price
at pm2 |c=0 and to discard some inventories. When the inventory cost sp is sufficiently large, the
second period price at which inventories are fully exhausted exceeds the static monopoly level,
i.e., p∗2 > pm2 . In this case, the inventory level I∗ < D2 (pm2 ) does not suffice to maximize the
second period profits, since the marginal revenue at I∗ is higher than the marginal cost c. The
firm is inclined to reduce the price at pm2 and to produce some additional quantity.
Since the result in Proposition 1 holds for a sufficiently large cost of production, a natural
issue is whether the strategic role of inventories persists when the cost of production is relatively
small and therefore the ex ante optimal inventory level violates the constraint of sequential
optimality. To this end, we begin with the characterization of the possible inventory outcomes
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose c < c˜. Then, under limited commitment, if the producer holds inventories,
one of the following outcomes arises:
(a) producer’s inventories and buyer stockpiling, i.e., Iis = −pis2 Dis2|1 , Diss = φis2 + cDis2|1 ,
and prices pis1 = c−
Dis1 +φ
is
2 −spDis2|1−(sb−sp)
(
φis
2|1+cD
is
2|11
)
Dis
1|1
, pis2 = p
is
1 + sb;
(b) producer’s inventories but no buyer stockpiling, i.e., Iin = Din2 , D
in
s = 0, and prices
pin1 = p
in
2 − sb, pin2 = pm2 |c=0 .
We know from the discussion following Proposition 1 that, if the cost of production is
relatively small, i.e., c < c˜, the amount of inventories that maximizes the producer’s ex ante
profits is excessive from the second period perspective and cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
The inventory level must be distorted below the ex ante optimal level, and the constraint of
sequential optimality is binding in equilibrium. Inventories still mitigate the buyer stockpiling
incentives since they involve a reduction in future prices, but buyer stockpiling is not fully
removed. Similarly to Lemma 2(a), buyer stockpiling emerges in Lemma 3(a) when the second
period demand is relatively high or the buyer stockpiling cost is small enough. Since the no-
arbitrage constraint is binding, buyers are indeed indifferent to storing in equilibrium, and buyer
stockpiling is endogenously derived by taking into account the producer’s response.
Interestingly, we find that a lower inventory cost leads to higher prices as long as the second
period demand is not too convex. To understand the rationale for this surprising result, it is
important to note from Lemma 3(a) that a higher price reduces the buyer stockpiling Diss (p1),
which translates into a higher second period net demand D2 (p1 + sb)−Diss (p1) when the second
period demand D2 is not too convex. Since the producer’s inventories coincide with the second
period net demand, cheaper inventories make it more attractive for the producer to expand the
second period net demand, which requires higher prices.16
16Using (5), we find thatDiss|1 (p1) = 2D2|1 (p1 + sb)+(p1 + sb)D2|11 (p1 + sb) < 0, where the inequality follows
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Lemma 3(b) reveals that, in line with Lemma 2(b), when the second period demand is
relatively low or the buyer stockpiling cost is high enough, buyer stockpiling does not take place
in equilibrium. Since inventories cover the second period demand, the producer sets the second
period price at the monopoly level with zero costs.
We can now present the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose 0 < c < c˜. Then, under limited commitment, as long as in the ab-
sence of producer’s inventories buyer stockpiling arises, holding inventories is profitable for the
producer if the inventory cost sp and the cost of production c are small enough.
Inventories can be profitable for the producer despite the fact that the solution in Proposition
1 is not implementable. One of the outcomes in Lemma 3 emerges in equilibrium. The benefit
of inventories still consists in the reduction in the second period price, which mitigates the buyer
stockpiling incentives. Differently from Proposition 1, it follows from Lemma 3 that the cost
of holding inventories is not only the mere physical inventory cost but also the loss due to the
distortion from the ex ante optimal inventory level to ensure sequential optimality. In other
terms, when the cost of production is small enough, inventories are a less effective instrument
to mitigate the buyer stockpiling incentives. Consequently, buyer stockpiling can persist in
equilibrium. A comparison between the results in Propositions 1 and 2 reveals that a larger
cost of production improves the strategic value of inventories.
As formally shown in the Appendix, Proposition 2 provides sufficient, albeit not necessary,
conditions for the profit superiority of inventories, which ensure that the producer can replicate
the equilibrium pricing policy without inventories described in Lemma 2(a) and be better off
due to a reduction in buyer stockpiling. In particular, since from Lemmas 2(a) and 3(a) the
buyer stockpiling difference evaluated at pns1 is D
ns
s (p
ns
1 )−Diss (pns1 ) = −cDns2|1 > 0 (for c > 0),
a sufficiently small (but positive) cost of production c implies that, for any buyer stockpiling
level Dnss (p
ns
1 ) > 0 without inventories, there exists a lower feasible buyer stockpiling level
Diss (p
ns
1 ) ≥ 0 with inventories. A fortiori, the producer’s benefits are larger when equilibrium
prices with inventories are considered.
5 Price comparisons
The following proposition formalizes the price comparisons across different scenarios. Some
threshold values are derived in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 For τ ∈ {1, 2}, the following price orderings hold:
(i) pcτ ≤ p∗τ < pnsτ < pnnτ , where pcτ = p∗τ if and only if sp = 0 and p∗τ < pnsτ if and only if
sp < sp;
from Assumption 1 (second-order condition for the maximization of static second period profits with zero costs).
It can be immediately shown that the sign of the derivative of D2 (p1 + sb)−Diss (p1) = − (p1 + sb)D2|1 (p1 + sb)
with respect to p1 is positive if and only if D2|11 (p1 + sb) < −D2|1 (p1+sb)p1+sb . This is the same condition under
which pis1 decreases with sp. Differentiating the left-hand side of the first-order condition for p
is
1 in (12) in the
Appendix with respect to sp yields after some manipulation (p1 + sb)D2|11 (p1 + sb) +D2|1 (p1 + sb). It follows
from the implicit function theorem that
∂pis1
∂sp
< 0 if and only if this expression is negative, i.e., D2|11 (p1 + sb) <
−D2|1 (p1+sb)
p1+sb
.
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(ii) pisτ < p
in
τ ≤ pnnτ , where pinτ = pnnτ if and only if c = 0;
(iii) pisτ < p
ns
τ if and only if one of the following conditions holds: (a) D
ns
2|11 ≤ 0 and sp > ŝp;
(b) 0 < Dns2|11 < D̂2|11 ; (c) D
ns
2|11 ≥ D̂2|11 and sp < ŝp.
Proposition 3 delivers results of some interest. We begin with the price comparisons collected
in point (i). As discussed in Section 4, the solution in Proposition 1, where the ex ante optimal
inventory level is also sequentially optimal, leads to prices distorted above the full commitment
level as long as holding inventories is costly, i.e., pcτ < p
∗
τ for sp > 0. This is because the
producer passes a part of these costs on to the buyers. The full commitment solution can be
replicated if and only if holding inventories is costless, i.e., pcτ = p
∗
τ for sp = 0.
Inventories allow a producer with limited commitment powers to generally charge lower
prices, i.e., p∗τ < pnsτ and p∗τ < pnnτ . The result that, despite being costly, inventories lead
to lower prices stems from their strategic role in mitigating future costs. In particular, we
find that p∗τ < pnsτ as long as the inventory cost sp is small enough, i.e., sp < sp. Using
Dnss in Lemma 2(a), it follows from (13) in the Appendix that this condition corresponds to
spD
ns
2|1 > sbD
ns
s|1 . The term on the left-hand side captures the inventory cost effect, whose sign is
negative. This is because a higher price reduces the second period demand, which coincides with
the producer’s inventories, and therefore mitigates the aggregate inventory costs. This effect is
more pronounced when the unit inventory cost sp is higher. The term on the right-hand side
captures the buyer stockpiling effect, whose sign is also negative (Dnss|1 = φ
ns
2|1 < 0 by Assumption
1, where φ2(.) is defined by (5)). The idea is that a higher price reduces the buyer stockpiling
Dnss and the associated loss for the producer. The comparison between these two effects implies
that, if the inventory cost sp is sufficiently small, i.e., sp < sp, the buyer stockpiling effect
dominates (in absolute terms) and prices are lower in the presence of inventories, as expected.
However, we cannot dismiss the opposite case, which seems at first sight less intuitive. To see
this, note that when the second period demand is sufficiently convex the price impact on the
buyer stockpiling Dnss in Lemma 2(a) is negligible (D
ns
s|1 = φ
ns
2|1 → 0). Hence, the inventory cost
effect dominates (in absolute terms) even for relatively low values of sp and prices are higher
when the producer holds inventories. The reason is that with a sufficiently convex demand
higher prices are more beneficial to the reduction in the aggregate inventory costs than to the
reduction in buyer stockpiling. It is important to realize that, as long as the inventory cost is
not too large, inventories are profitable for the producer since they remove buyer stockpiling,
although equilibrium prices may rise. The fact that buyer stockpiling disappears despite higher
prices is only apparently a contradiction. In equilibrium, the no-arbitrage constraint is binding
irrespective of the producer’s inventories, and therefore buyers are indeed indifferent between
stockpiling or not.
We can also see from point (i) that p∗τ < pnnτ , where pnn2 = pm2 by Lemma 2(b). As discussed
after Proposition 1, the equilibrium second period price with inventories must be lower than the
static monopoly level in order to be implementable.17 Moreover, we have pnsτ < p
nn
τ , since buyer
stockpiling reduces the demand (and the price) in the second period. An immediate implication
of the results in point (i) is that, when the cost of production is sufficiently large that the ex
17Note that a lower price in one period implies a lower price in the other period as well, since the no-arbitrage
constraint is always binding in equilibrium, i.e., p2 = p1 + sb.
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ante optimal level of inventories is also sequentially optimal, the producer’s inventories lead to
lower prices as long as the inventory cost is small enough. Therefore, consumer surplus and
profits are higher, and inventory activities unambiguously enhance social welfare.
As point (ii) of Proposition 3 reveals, when the solution in Proposition 1 is not implementable
and the producer’s inventories must be distorted from the ex ante optimal level to ensure
sequential optimality, prices are still lower with respect to the situation where no storing occurs
in the economy. In particular, when the producer holds inventories, buyer stockpiling leads to
lower prices, i.e., pisτ < p
in
τ , since it dampens the demand (and the price) in the second period.
Moreover, in the absence of buyer stockpiling, the producer’s inventories ensure lower prices
unless production is costless, i.e., pinτ ≤ pnnτ , where the equality holds if and only if c = 0.
Point (iii) of Proposition 3 indicates that the welfare conclusions drawn from point (i)
deserve some qualifications when inventories are distorted from the ex ante optimal level. Using
Dnss (p1) and D
is
s (p1) in Lemmas 2(a) and 3(a), it follows from (14) in the Appendix that
pisτ < p
ns
τ if and only if sp
[
D2|1 (pns1 )−Diss|1 (pns1 )
]
> sb
[
Dnss|1 (p
ns
1 )−Diss|1 (pns1 )
]
. Differently
from point (i), the inventory cost effect on the left-hand side is now positive as long as the second
period demand is not too convex, i.e., Dns2|11 < D̂2|11 , where D̂2|11 > 0. To understand why,
recall from the discussion following Lemma 3 that higher prices decrease buyer stockpiling and,
provided that the second period demand is not too convex, this translates into a higher second
period demand net of buyer stockpiling, which coincides with the producer’s inventories. Hence,
lower prices mitigate the aggregate inventory costs. A higher sp strengthens the inventory
cost effect. Furthermore, differently from point (i), since buyer stockpiling persists with the
producer’s inventories, the buyer stockpiling effect on the right-hand side now concerns the
buyer stockpiling difference, whose amount evaluated at pns1 is D
ns
s (p
ns
1 )−Diss (pns1 ) = −cDns2|1 ,
as it follows from Lemmas 2(a) and 3(a). The positive (negative) sign of this effect means that
a higher price is more (less) helpful for the reduction in buyer stockpiling when the producer
holds inventories. If the second period demand is concave, i.e., Dns2|11 ≤ 0, the buyer stockpiling
effect is also positive. The comparison between the two effects implies that the inventory cost
effect dominates and prices are lower when the producer holds inventories if the second period
demand is concave and the unit inventory cost is high enough, i.e., pisτ < p
ns
τ if D
ns
2|11 ≤ 0 and
sp > ŝp, as point (iii-a) of Proposition 3 indicates.
If the second period demand is convex, i.e., Dns2|11 > 0, the buyer stockpiling effect is negative.
This implies that, if the second period demand is only moderately convex, i.e., 0 < Dns2|11 <
D̂2|11 , the two effects push in the same direction and prices are lower when the producer holds
inventories, i.e., pisτ < p
ns
τ , as point (iii-b) reveals.
If the second period demand is sufficiently convex, i.e., Dns2|11 ≥ D̂2|11 , the producer’s inven-
tories decrease rather than increase with prices, and the inventory cost effect is now negative.
Since the buyer stockpiling effect is also negative with convex demand, we find that the latter
effect dominates (in absolute terms) and the producer sets lower prices when holding inventories
if the second period demand is sufficiently convex and the unit inventory cost is small enough,
i.e., pisτ < p
ns
τ if D
ns
2|11 ≥ D̂2|11 and sp < ŝp, as point (iii-c) establishes. Note that, similarly to
point (i), inventories may lead to higher prices. The difference is that, since inventories are now
distorted from the ex ante optimal level, buyer stockpiling is not fully removed, which makes
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price comparisons more convoluted.
6 Linear demand
We now consider a linear demand of the form Dτ (pτ ) = ατ − pτ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, which allows
an explicit characterization of the results. It follows from the producer’s problem in (4) that
the equilibrium static monopoly price in period τ is pmτ =
ατ+c
2 . Assumption 2 becomes the
following.
Assumption 2
′
pm1 + sb < p
m
2 ⇔ sb < α2−α12 .
Since sb > 0, Assumption 2
′
requires that the demand must be higher in the second period,
i.e., α2 > α1.
The formal results are collected in the Supplementary Appendix. The condition about
the costs of production in Proposition 1 is c ≥ c˜ ≡ α2−α1−2sb−sp2 . This ensures that any ex
ante optimal inventory level is not excessive from the second period perspective. Notably, a
higher buyer stockpiling cost sb reduces the threshold c˜. This is because more expensive buyer
stockpiling induces a higher second period price, which alleviates the producer’s temptation
to increase the price above the level at which inventories are fully exhausted and to discard a
portion of them in the second period. In the same vein, a higher inventory cost sp also leads to
a reduction in the threshold c˜. However, recall from the discussion after Proposition 1 that a
high inventory cost translates into a second period price above the static monopoly level, which
is not sequentially optimal and cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
sb
sp
sp2
sp1
α2−α1
4
Πns
Π∗
Πnn
Π∗
Figure 2: Producer’s profits for c ≥ c˜
Figure 2 illustrates the case where the cost of production is relatively large, i.e., c ≥ c˜.
Suppose first that the demand growth is sufficiently pronounced or the buyer stockpiling cost
is relatively small, i.e., sb <
α2−α1
4 . If the inventory cost is relatively low, i.e., sp ≤ sp1 , the
producer holds the ex ante optimal level of inventories and fully removes buyer stockpiling, as
Proposition 1 indicates. Otherwise, as in the most interesting scenario in Dudine et al. (2006)
formalized in Lemma 2(a), the producer does not engage in inventory activities and buyer
stockpiling emerges in equilibrium. When the demand growth is relatively moderate or the
buyer stockpiling cost is high enough, i.e., sb ≥ α2−α14 (still satisfying Assumption 2
′
), buyer
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stockpiling never occurs in equilibrium. In particular, when the inventory cost is low enough,
i.e., sp ≤ sp2 , the producer holds inventories in equilibrium. Otherwise, the no-storing outcome
characterized in Lemma 2(b) holds.
Note from Figure 2 that a higher buyer stockpiling cost widens the scope for strategic
inventories. Since buyers are willing to pay a higher second period price, the surplus from the
avoided buyer stockpiling that the producer can extract is larger. As formally shown in the
Supplementary Appendix, the threshold values sp1 and sp2 below which holding inventories is
profitable for the producer increase with the cost of production c. In line with the discussion
following Proposition 1, the idea is that a higher c amplifies the reduction in future prices
associated with the producer’s inventories, which translates into a wider range of values for sp
that supports inventories in equilibrium.
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(a) min {sp4 , sp5} = sp4 ⇔ α2 high enough
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(b) min {sp4 , sp5} = sp5 ⇔ α2 low enough
Figure 3: Producer’s profits for c < c˜
Now, we turn to the case where the cost of production is relatively small, i.e., c < c˜, which
implies that the ex ante optimal inventory level is excessive from the second period perspective.
As Figure 3 illustrates, there is still scope for strategic inventories, although things become more
involved. Suppose first that the demand growth is sufficiently high or the buyer stockpiling cost
is relatively small, i.e., sb <
α2−α1−2c
4 . In line with the case c ≥ c˜, the producer finds it optimal
to hold inventories when the inventory cost is sufficiently small, i.e., sp ≤ sp3 . The key difference
is that, since the amount of inventories is distorted from the ex ante optimal level in order to
ensure sequential optimality, buyer stockpiling cannot be fully removed. This corresponds to
the outcome in Lemma 3(a). When the inventory cost is high enough, i.e., sp > sp3 , only buyer
stockpiling emerges in equilibrium.
For intermediate values of the buyer stockpiling cost, i.e., α2−α1−2c4 < sb <
α2−α1
4 , the
producer can still benefit from using inventories. In particular, if the inventory cost is low
enough, i.e., sp ≤ min {sp4 , sp5}, the producer holds inventories and buyer stockpiling vanishes,
as Lemma 3(b) predicts. Moreover, when the demand growth is sufficiently pronounced –
which means that min {sp4 , sp5} = sp4 , as formally shown in the Supplementary Appendix – the
producer prefers to hold inventories and allow buyer stockpiling, provided that the inventory
cost is not too high, i.e., sp4 < sp ≤ sp3 . Otherwise, only buyer stockpiling materializes.
The comparison between panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 shows that a higher second period
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demand enlarges the scope for strategic inventories. This is because a higher demand makes
it more profitable for the producer to stimulate the second period sales through a reduction in
buyer stockpiling induced by the inventory activities.
When the buyer stockpiling cost is high enough, i.e., sb ≥ α2−α14 , no storing takes place in
the economy. It is worth noting that, differently from the case c ≥ c˜, the producer never profits
from inventories. Buyer stockpiling does not occur even in the absence of inventories and the
full commitment solution cannot be approached since inventories are distorted from the ex ante
optimal level to satisfy sequential optimality.
7 Robustness and extensions
7.1 Competition
The presence of competition among producers definitely deserves some attention. As discussed
in the introduction, competitive markets for storable goods have been examined in the litera-
ture. For our purposes, it is helpful to consider two relevant contributions that focus on storing
activities on the two opposite sides of the market. In a two-period Cournot duopoly model that
allows for buyer stockpiling, Anton and Das Varma (2005) show that each firm prefers to reduce
its price in the first period and to capture the resulting buyer stockpiling rather than share the
demand with the rival in the second period. The possibility of buyer stockpiling exacerbates
competition and leads to lower prices. The firms’ incentives to attract buyer stockpiling are
stronger when the demand growth is smaller, since the second period market is less relevant.
Conversely, in our setting as well as in Dudine et al. (2006), buyer stockpiling is profit detri-
mental when the demand growth is high enough. Therefore, we expect that, if the demand does
not increase significantly over time, the firms’ incentives to compete for buyer stockpiling a` la
Anton and Das Varma (2005) will prevail. However, when the demand growth is high enough,
the firms’ incentives to mitigate buyer stockpiling and share the demand in the following period
should be dominant, as in our setting. The predictions of our model naturally extend to a
competitive environment, and firms will hold inventories to reduce future prices and discourage
buyer stockpiling. A natural implication is that, when competition is intense, firms tend to be-
have aggressively and stimulate buyer stockpiling. In the presence of higher degrees of market
concentration or product differentiation, firms can internalize to a larger extent the strategic
dynamic benefits of inventories driven by the lower buyer stockpiling incentives. This provides
theoretical corroboration for the empirical evidence documented by Amihud and Mendelson
(1989) that a larger level of inventories is associated with greater market power.
A second contribution relevant for our purposes is Mitraille and Moreaux (2013), which
abstracts from buyer stockpiling and considers a two-period model where identical firms accu-
mulate inventories in the first period and engage in Cournot competition in the second period.
Inventories allow some firms to exert endogenously a Stackelberg leadership over the rivals.
The main results are derived for a relatively low demand. This condition is likely to fail in our
framework, where the demand grows in the second period. Therefore, we provide a comple-
mentary explanation for inventories that generally applies to different circumstances from those
analyzed in Mitraille and Moreaux (2013). Notably, when the two inventory incentives coexist,
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they are mutually reinforcing.
7.2 Number of periods
A natural extension of our framework is to allow for a number of periods larger than two. We
feel that a two-period model is the most adequate for various reasons aside from its analytical
tractability. Demand predictions are likely to be accurate only in the near future. Moreover,
storable goods generally depreciate over time and can be stockpiled only for a limited period.
Nonetheless, it is of some interest to incorporate a larger time horizon into our analysis.
To fix ideas, consider a three-period model where the demand increases over time so that
buyers are willing to stockpile across periods when the producer charges the static monopoly
price. Production costs are sufficiently large that the producer does not want to discard some
inventories after the second period starts. For the sake of simplicity, suppose for the time being
that holding inventories is costless. We know from Proposition 1 that under these conditions
the full commitment outcome can be restored in a two-period setting. A novel feature now
emerges, since the producer may have an incentive to reallocate the full commitment quantities
between the second and the third period given that their associated costs are sunk. When
the third period marginal revenues are larger than the second period marginal revenues, i.e.,
MR3 (D
c
3) > MR2 (D
c
2), the producer succumbs to the temptation to carry some quantity from
the second to the third period and to increase the second period price. Anticipating this, buyers
decide to store in the first period and the full commitment outcome is not feasible anymore.
However, things are different in the opposite case where marginal revenues are larger in the
second period than in the third period, i.e., MR2 (D
c
2) > MR3 (D
c
3). Now, the producer would
like to sell more in the second period, but it does not do so since a lower second period price
would trigger buyer stockpiling in the same period, which is profit detrimental. Therefore, the
full commitment outcome can be restored, as in the baseline model. This is the case when the
demand is expected to rise significantly in the third period, since the resulting price pattern
pm2 < p
c
2 < p
c
3 < p
m
3 implies that MR2 (D
c
2) > c > MR3 (D
c
3). By continuity, the same ordering
of marginal revenues persists for MR2 (D
c
2) < c. Notably, it always holds in the extended
version of the linear model described in Section 6.18 Similar results clearly emerge when the
inventory cost is small enough, and therefore the predictions of our model generalize to a larger
time horizon.
7.3 Forward contracts
In practice, a potentially valuable instrument to which a firm can resort in some markets to
restore its commitment powers is a forward or futures contract that specifies the trade of a
good at a given price, with delivery and payment occurring at a future point.19 We argue that
in our framework forward contracting cannot remove the commitment problem. The presence
of buyers that act in the market as arbitrageurs or speculators and are not interested in final
18Applying the framework formalized in the Supplementary Appendix to a three-period model with demand
Dτ = ατ−pτ , τ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we find that the full commitment prices are pc1 = α1+α2+α3+3(c−2sb)6 , pc2 = pc1+sb and
pc3 = p
c
1 + 2sb. Standard computations yield MR2 (D
c
2) −MR3 (Dc3) = α3 − α2 − 2sb > 0, where the inequality
follows from the condition pm2 + sb < p
m
3 (direct extension of Assumption 2
′
in a three-period model).
19This may also apply to the setting of Dudine et al. (2006).
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consumption generates ex post incentives for contract renegotiation between the producer and
the buyers. Indeed, forward contracts are rarely executed in reality.
D2(p2)
MR2
p2
pr2
D2(p
r
2)
pc2
D2(p
c
2)
Figure 4: Forward contracts
To understand the rationale for this result, consider a contract that commits the producer
to deliver to the buyers in the second period a quantity D2 (p
c
2) at a unit price p
c
2, which
potentially replicates the full commitment solution. If the contract is perfectly enforced, buyers
clearly make zero profits, since they resell the good to final consumers at the same price pc2.
With the help of Figure 4 we can see that the contract renegotiation in the second period is
mutually beneficial. Suppose that a new contract is proposed according to which the producer
retains the quantity D2 (p
r
2) < D2 (p
c
2) in exchange for a two-part tariff specifying a unit price
pc2 and a fixed fee. Since the producer can charge a unit price p
r
2 > p
c
2 to final consumers,
the fixed fee allows the producer to share the resulting gains from trade with the buyers. The
residual quantity D2 (p
c
2) −D2 (pr2) may be regularly delivered by the producer at pc2 and sold
to final consumers at the same price. The producer is able to engage in price discrimination
among final consumers and to increase the second period profits relative to full commitment.
Consequently, the full commitment solution collapses.
Notably, the fact that buyers purchase the entire full commitment quantity D2 (p
c
2) through
forward contracting is irrelevant. Our rationale carries over even when final consumers also
participate in the forward market, although this seems less plausible to occur in practice. The
crucial point is that the presence of buyers that are not interested in final consumption prevents
forward contracts from restoring the full commitment solution.
7.4 Discount factor
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the producer attaches the same weight to its current
and future profits, namely, the discount factor equals 1. In line with Dudine et al. (2006), this
captures in a simple manner the economic relevance of the producer’s inability to commit to
future prices. Our qualitative results clearly extend to a more general discount factor, provided
that the producer places enough weight on the future. Otherwise, the producer’s prominent
attention to its current profits makes buyer stockpiling beneficial and the limited commitment
problem becomes inconsequential, which removes the scope for strategic inventories. In our
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framework, the inventory cost sp can be interpreted as a measure of the weight on the future in
the firm’s current production and inventory decisions. A lower sp reflects a greater interest in
accumulating inventories for future sales at a higher price. Therefore, our model predicts that
the inventories of a producer with a longer business horizon mitigate to a larger extent the loss
from the lack of limited commitment. Note that, while the discount factor generally applies to
the entire profits, the inventory cost only directly affects the production and inventory activities.
Despite this difference, since a higher discount factor makes the producer’s limited commitment
problem more significant, we expect that a larger strategic use of inventories will be associated
with a higher discount factor (or lower interest rates), analogously to what we find with a lower
inventory cost.
The buyer stockpiling cost sb captures the buyer discount factor in an intuitive manner.
The buyer stockpiling behavior affects the producer’s intertemporal problem more prominently
when buyers are more forward-looking, namely, the buyer stockpiling cost is lower.
8 Conclusions: managerial, empirical and policy implications
A full understanding of the firms’ inventory behavior is a challenging task that goes well be-
yond our study. In this paper, we unveil a strategic channel for inventories that complements
the traditional inventory theories. We characterize the producer’s strategic incentives to hold
inventories in a dynamic storable good monopoly framework a` la Dudine et al. (2006) where
the producer is unable to commit to future prices and forward-looking buyers can stockpile in
expectation of higher future prices. Anticipating that the producer cannot refrain from charging
a higher future price than under full commitment, buyers engage in wasteful stockpiling. In this
setting, we show that the producer’s inventories act as a strategic device to mitigate the loss
from the lack of commitment. Since their cost is sunk when being available for sale, inventories
reduce future costs, which translates into lower future prices and weakens the buyer stockpiling
incentives. When the (unit) cost of production is relatively large, the producer accumulates
the level of inventories that maximizes the ex ante profits, and the constraint of sequential
optimality is slack in equilibrium. As a result, buyer stockpiling is fully removed, despite the
lack of commitment. The only additional cost is the mere inventory cost. When the cost of
production is small enough, inventories can be still beneficial for the producer although their
amount is distorted from the ex ante optimal level to ensure sequential optimality. This implies
that buyer stockpiling can persist in equilibrium. We also provide non-trivial results about
the features of equilibrium prices. Although our attention is devoted to storable goods, similar
storage incentives apply to durable goods, as Dudine et al. (2006) emphasize. Therefore, the
predictions of our model can be extended to durable good markets.
The plainness of our analysis allows us to identify in a transparent and intuitive manner a
novel strategic rationale for inventories that leads to potentially significant managerial, empirical
and policy implications. Our results recommend as a profitable strategy for managers the
inventory accumulation in periods of demand expansion. We also provide theoretical support
for the anecdotal evidence about the companies’ advertisement and disclosure of their product
availability (e.g., Krishnan and Winter 2009, 2010; Yin et al. 2009).
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Our analysis sheds new light on some well-established empirical facts, such as inventory
procyclicality and the positive relationship between inventories and market power. The empir-
ical implications of our results include the impact of inventories on the firm’s performance. As
emphasized by Eroglu and Hofer (2011), despite the popularity of the lean inventory practices,
there exists limited empirical evidence that lean inventory management improves the firm’s per-
formance. Using a panel data set of 54 US manufacturing industries in the period 2003-2008,
Eroglu and Hofer (2011) find that the inventory-performance relationship varies significantly
across industries and lean inventory practices are not profitable in a number of industries. As
they suggest, a relatively large use of inventories can be driven by industry-specific features,
such as product and demand conditions. Our study proposes the empirically testable explana-
tion based on buyer product storability and demand expansion. A related financial implication
potentially helpful for investors in the stock and commodity markets is the role of inventories
as a predictor of higher profitability in storable good markets when the demand is expected to
grow.
A stochastic version of our model can capture other relevant pieces of the empirical evidence
about inventories. In a setting a` la Kahn (1987) where the demand is uncertain and exhibits
positive serial correlation, a positive demand shock increases production more than sales to
cover the higher expected future demand. A negative demand shock reduces production more
than sales in expectation of lower future demand, and the producer will not hold any inventories
for the future if expected demand is low enough. This makes the volatility of production larger
than the volatility of sales, consistently with the empirical evidence.
We bring to the public debate a number of additional findings that lend themselves to an
empirical or experimental validation and can stimulate further research on the crucial business
issue of inventory management. Our results suggest that inventories are more likely to be
observed in industries with larger costs of production, and they typically lead to higher aggregate
production and lower prices over time. This generates policy implications of some relevance,
especially in terms of inventory taxation.
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Appendix
This Appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. Under full commitment, the producer’s maximization problem is
max
p1,p2,I
(p1 − c) [D1 (p1) +Ds (p1)]− (c+ sp) I
+ p2 [D2 (p2)−Ds (p1)]− c [D2 (p2)−Ds (p1)− I] · 1Q2 .
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Since the objective function decreases with I, we have Ic = 0 in equilibrium. Using (1), we
identify the following three cases: (a) p1 + sb > p2, which implies Ds (p1) = 0; (b) p1 + sb = p2,
which implies Ds (p1) ∈ [0, D2 (p1 + sb)]; (c) p1 + sb < p2, which implies Ds (p1) = D2 (p1 + sb).
We examine these cases one by one.
(a) p1 + sb > p2 ⇒ Ds (p1) = 0. The producer’s maximization problem reduces to the
unconstrained problem in (4), which leads to the equilibrium static monopoly prices pm1 and
pm2 . However, the supposition p
m
1 + sb > p
m
2 violates Assumption 2. Since for any price p
′
2 < p
m
2
such that pm1 + sb > p
′
2 there exists a p
′′
2 such that p
′′
2 > p
′
2 and p
m
1 + sb > p
′′
2 which makes the
producer better off (the second period profits increase), we conclude that case (a) is irrelevant.
(b) p1 + sb = p2 ⇒ Ds (p1) ∈ [0, D2 (p1 + sb)]. Note that in equilibrium it must hold
Ds (p1) = 0, otherwise the producer would have an incentive to slightly increase p1 and induce no
buyer stockpiling, which entails a discontinuous increase in profits. The producer’s maximization
problem becomes
max
p1
(p1 − c)D1 (p1) + (p1 + sb − c)D2 (p1 + sb) .
Taking the first-order condition for p1 yields
D1 (p1) + (p1 − c)D1|1 (p1) + φ2(p1 + sb) = 0, (8)
where φ2(.) is defined by (5). This implies p
c
1 = c− D
c
1+φ
c
2
Dc
1|1
and pc2 = p
c
1 + sb.
(c) p1 + sb < p2 ⇒ Ds (p1) = D2 (p1 + sb). Buyers store in the first period and abstain from
purchasing in the second period. However, the producer can do better by setting p′2 = p1 + sb,
which implies from case (b) that the producer can serve D2 (p1 + sb) at p1 + sb in the second
period rather than at p1 in the first period. Therefore, case (c) is irrelevant.
It follows from the previous analysis that the full commitment solution reflects the out-
come in case (b). We now show that pc1 > p
m
1 and p
c
2 < p
m
2 , where p
m
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, is the
solution to the producer’s maximization problem in (4). To show pc1 > p
m
1 , we substitute
the first-order condition for pm1 , i.e., D1 (p1) + (p1 − c)D1|1 (p1) = 0, into the left-hand side
of the first-order condition for pc1 in (8). This yields φ2(p
m
1 + sb) > 0, where the inequality
follows from Assumption 2. Then, Assumption 1 implies pc1 > p
m
1 . To show p
c
2 < p
m
2 , we
substitute the first-order condition for pm2 , i.e., φ2(p2) = 0, into the left-hand side of the first-
order condition for pc2, which corresponds to the first-order condition for p
c
1 in (8). This yields
D1 (p
m
2 − sb) + (pm2 − sb − c)D1|2 (pm2 − sb) < 0, where the inequality follows from Assumption
2. Then, Assumption 1 implies pc2 < p
m
2 .
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider first p1 + sb = p2, which implies Ds (p1) ∈ [0, D2 (p1 + sb)]. It
follows from the constraint of sequential optimality p2 = c− D2(p2)−Ds(p1)D2|2 (p2) in (7) with I = 0 that
Ds (p1) = max {φ2(p1 + sb), 0} ,
where φ2(.) is defined by (5). Suppose first that Ds (p1) > 0. Substituting Ds (p1) into (6) with
I = 0, the producer’s maximization problem becomes after some manipulation
max
p1
(p1 − c)D1 (p1) + (p1 + sb − c)D2 (p1 + sb)− sbφ2(p1 + sb).
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The first-order condition for p1 is
D1 (p1) + (p1 − c)D1|1 (p1) + φ2(p1 + sb)− sbφ2|1 (p1 + sb) = 0, (9)
which yields pns1 = c−
Dns1 +φ
ns
2 −sbφns2|1
Dns
1|1
and pns2 = p
ns
1 +sb. Buyer stockpiling is D
ns
s = φ
ns
2 , where
φns2 ≡ φ2(pns1 + sb). This is the result in point (a) of the lemma. If Dnss ≤ 0, buyer stockpiling
is Dnns = 0, with prices p
nn
1 = p
nn
2 − sb and pnn2 = c− D
nn
2
Dnn
2|2
= pm2 . This is the result in point (b)
of the lemma.
Following the same rationale as in the proof of Lemma 1 in points (a) and (c), the remaining
two cases, i.e., p1 + sb > p2 and p1 + sb < p2, are irrelevant.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that the producer chooses to hold inventories. We charac-
terize the conditions under which this strategy is optimal. Consider first p1 + sb = p2, which
implies Ds (p1) ∈ [0, D2 (p1 + sb)]. At the end of the proof, we check that the other cases are
irrelevant. Since I = D2 (p1 + sb)−Ds (p1), ignoring the constraint of sequential optimality in
(7), the producer’s maximization program is given by
max
p1
(p1 − c)D1 (p1) + (p1 + sb − c− sp)D2 (p1 + sb)− (sb − sp)Ds (p1) .
As sp ≤ sb, we have Ds (p1) = 0 in equilibrium. The first-order condition for p1 is
D1 (p1) + (p1 − c)D1|1 (p1) + φ2(p1 + sb)− spD2|1 (p1 + sb) = 0, (10)
which yields p∗1 = c−
D∗1+φ
∗
2−spD∗2|1
D∗
1|1
and p∗2 = p∗1 + sb. We now show that selling I∗ = D∗2 in the
second period satisfies the constraint of sequential optimality if and only if pm2 |c=0 ≤ p∗2 ≤ pm2 .
The second period cost function C2 (p2) is c [D2 (p2)−D∗2] for p2 < p∗2 and zero for p2 ≥ p∗2,
which yields a marginal cost C2|2 (p2) equal to cD2|2 (p2) for p2 < p∗2 and zero for p2 > p∗2.
The second period revenue function is R2 (p2) = p2D2 (p2), which entails a marginal revenue
R2|2 (p2) = D2 (p2) + p2D2|2 (p2). Assume first that p∗2 < pm2 |c=0 , where R2|2 (pm2 |c=0 ) = 0.
Since the concavity (by Assumption 1) of the static second period profit function with zero costs
implies that R2|2 (p2) decreases with p2, we have R2|2 (p∗2) > limp2→p∗+2 C2|2 (p2) = 0. Then,
charging a price above p∗2 and discarding some inventories increases the producer’s second period
profits. In other words, p∗2 < pm2 |c=0 is not sequentially optimal. Now, assume that p∗2 > pm2 ,
where R2|2 (pm2 ) = cD2|2 (pm2 ). Since the concavity (by Assumption 1) of the static second period
profit function with marginal costs c (maximized at pm2 ) implies that R2|2 (p∗2) < cD2|2 (p∗2),
we have R2|2 (p∗2) < limp2→p∗−2 C2|2 (p2) = cD2|2 (p
∗
2). Then, charging a price below p
∗
2 and
producing some additional quantity increases the producer’s second period profits. In other
words, a price p∗2 > pm2 is not sequentially optimal, either. The last step is to show that, if
pm2 |c=0 ≤ p∗2 ≤ pm2 , then p∗2 is sequentially optimal. We have R2|2 (p∗2) ∈
[
cD2|2 (p∗2) , 0
]
, where
the upper and lower bounds of the interval hold if and only if p∗2 = pm2 |c=0 and p∗2 = pm2 ,
respectively. A price above p∗2 reduces the producer’s second period profits, since R2|2 (p∗2) ≤
limp2→p∗+2 C2|2 (p2) = 0. A price below p
∗
2 also reduces the producer’s second period profits,
since 0 ≥ R2|2 (p∗2) ≥ limp2→p∗−2 C2|2 (p2) = cD2|2 (p
∗
2). Hence, p
∗
2 is sequentially optimal if and
only if pm2 |c=0 ≤ p∗2 ≤ pm2 .
We now derive the conditions under which pm2 |c=0 ≤ p∗2 ≤ pm2 . Substituting the first-order
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condition for pm2 |c=0 , i.e., D2 (p2) + p2D2|2 (p2) = 0, into the left-hand side of the first-order
condition for p∗2, which corresponds to the first-order condition for p∗1 in (10), and using (5)
yields
D1 (p
m
2 |c=0 − sb) + (pm2 |c=0 − sb − c)D1|2 (pm2 |c=0 − sb)− (c+ sp)D2|2 (pm2 |c=0 ) ≥ 0
⇔ c ≥ c˜ ≡ D1 (p
m
2 |c=0 − sb) + (pm2 |c=0 − sb)D1|2 (pm2 |c=0 − sb)− spD2|2 (pm2 |c=0 )
D1|2 (pm2 |c=0 − sb) +D2|2 (pm2 |c=0 )
. (11)
It follows from Assumption 1 that p∗2 ≥ pm2 |c=0 if and only if c ≥ c˜. We find from Assumption
2 that c˜ > 0 for sp small enough.
Substituting the first-order condition for pm2 , i.e., D2 (p2) + (p2 − c)D2|2 (p2) = 0, into the
left-hand side of the first-order condition for p∗2, which corresponds to the first-order condition
for p∗1 in (10), and using (5) yields
D1 (p
m
2 − sb) + (pm2 − sb − c)D1|2 (pm2 − sb)− spD2|2 (pm2 ) ≤ 0
⇔ sp ≤
D1 (p
m
2 − sb) + (pm2 − sb − c)D1|2 (pm2 − sb)
D2|2 (pm2 )
,
where the expression on the right-hand side is positive by Assumption 2. It follows from
Assumption 1 that p∗2 ≤ pm2 if and only if this condition is satisfied. Using (8) and (10), we find
that for c ≥ c˜ the full commitment outcome is restored as long as sp = 0. By continuity, there
exists a threshold s˜p > 0 such that for sp ≤ s˜p the solution characterized in the proposition is
optimal.
Finally, we examine the remaining cases and show that they are irrelevant. Consider the case
p1 + sb > p2, which implies Ds (p1) = 0 and I = D2 (p2). This yields p1 = p
m
1 and p2 < p
m
1 + sb.
However, the producer can do better by holding a lower inventory level I = D2 (p
′
2), where
p′2 = pm1 +sb is sequentially optimal and closer to pm2 (from the left by Assumption 2). It follows
from the proof of Lemma 2 that the case p1 + sb < p2 is also irrelevant.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider first p1 + sb = p2, which implies Ds (p1) ∈ [0, D2 (p1 + sb)].
Since I = D2 (p1 + sb) − Ds (p1), it follows from the constraint of sequential optimality p2 =
−D2(p2)−Ds(p1)D2|2 (p2) in (7) that
Ds (p1) = max
{
φ2(p1 + sb) + cD2|1 (p1 + sb) , 0
}
.
Suppose first that Ds (p1) > 0. Substituting Ds (p1) into the producer’s maximization problem
in (6) yields after some manipulation
max
p1
(p1 − c)D1 (p1) + (p1 + sb − c− sp)D2 (p1 + sb)− (sb − sp)Ds (p1 + sb) .
The first-order condition for p1 is
D1 (p1) + (p1 − c)D1|1 (p1) + φ2(p1 + sb)− spD2|1 (p1 + sb)
− (sb − sp)
[
φ2|1 (p1 + sb) + cD2|11 (p1 + sb)
]
= 0, (12)
which yields pis1 = c −
Dis1 +φ
is
2 −spDis2|1−(sb−sp)
(
φis
2|1+cD
is
2|11
)
Dis
1|1
and pis2 = p
is
1 + sb. The producer’s
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inventories and buyer stockpiling are Iis = Dis2 −Diss = −pis2 Dis2|1 and Diss = φis2 + cDis2|1 , where
φis2 ≡ φ2
(
pis1 + sb
)
. This is the result in point (a) of the lemma. If Diss ≤ 0, the producer’s
inventories and buyer stockpiling are Iin = Din2 and D
in
s = 0, with prices p
in
1 = p
in
2 − sb and
pin2 = − D
in
2
Din
2|2
= pm2 |c=0 . This is the result in point (b) of the lemma.
Finally, we examine the remaining cases and show that they are irrelevant. Consider the
case p1 + sb > p2, which implies Ds (p1) = 0 and I = D2 (p2). This yields p1 = p
m
1 and
p2 = p
m
2 |c=0 < pm1 + sb. It follows from Assumption 2 that p′2 = pm1 + sb is such that pm2 |c=0 <
p′2 < pm2 . Applying the same rationale as in the proof of Proposition 1, we find that p′2 is
sequentially optimal and makes the producer better off. It follows from the proof of Lemma 2
that the case p1 + sb < p2 is also irrelevant.
Proof of Proposition 2. In the light of the proof of Lemma 2, if buyer stockpiling is Dnss =
φns2 > 0, the producer’s profits are
Πns (pns1 ) = (p
ns
1 − c)Dns1 + (pns1 + sb − c)Dns2 − sbφns2 .
It follows from the proof of Lemma 3 that the profits of a producer that holds inventories and
replicates the prices without inventories are given by
Πis (pns1 ) = (p
ns
1 − c)Dns1 + (pns1 + sb − c− sp)Dns2 − (sb − sp)Diss (pns1 ) ,
which is feasible when Diss (p
ns
1 ) = φ
ns
2 + cD
ns
2|1 ≥ 0. This yields after some manipulation
Πis (pns1 )−Πns (pns1 ) = −sbcDns2|1 − sp
(
Dns2 − φns2 − cDns2|1
)
= [sp (p
ns
1 + sb)− sbc]Dns2|1 > 0⇔ sp <
sbc
pns1 + sb
.
Since Dnss (p
ns
1 ) − Diss (pns1 ) = −cDns2|1 > 0 (for c > 0), we have for any Dnss (pns1 ) > 0 that
Diss (p
ns
1 ) ≥ 0 if c is small enough.
Proof of Proposition 3. The results in point (i) of the proposition follow from steps 1-4.
1. Substituting the first-order condition for pc1 in (8) into the left-hand side of the first-order
condition for p∗1 in (10) yields −spDc2|1 ≥ 0, where the equality follows if and only if sp = 0.
Assumption 1 implies that pc1 ≤ p∗1. Since p1 + sb = p2, we find pcτ ≤ p∗τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, where the
equality follows if and only if sp = 0.
2. Substituting the first-order condition for pns1 in (9) into the left-hand side of the first-order
condition for p∗1 in (10) yields
sbφ
ns
2|1 − spDns2|1 . (13)
The sign of (13) is negative if and only if sp <
sbφ
ns
2|1
Dns
2|1
≡ sp, where sp > 0. It follows from
Assumption 1 that p∗1 < pns1 if and only if sp < sp. Since p1 + sb = p2, we find p∗τ < pnsτ ,
τ ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if sp < sp.
3. It follows from the proof in Proposition 1 that p∗2 ≤ pm2 . Then, a (necessary) condition for
the (strict) optimality of inventories is that p∗2 < pm2 . Since pm2 = pnn2 from Lemma 2(b) and
p1 + sb = p2, we find p
∗
τ < p
nn
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}.
4. Substituting the first-order condition for pns2 , i.e., φ2(p2) −Dnss (p1) = 0, into the left-hand
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side of the first-order condition for pnn2 , i.e., φ2(p2) = 0, yields D
ns
s > 0, where the inequality
follows from Lemma 2(a). Assumption 1 implies pns2 < p
nn
2 . Since p1 + sb = p2, we find
pnsτ < p
nn
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}.
The results in point (ii) of the proposition follow from steps 5-6.
5. Substituting the first-order condition for pis2 , i.e., φ2(p2) + cD2|2 (p2)−Diss (p1) = 0, into the
left-hand side of the first-order condition for pin2 , i.e., φ2(p2) + cD2|2 (p2) = 0, yields Diss > 0,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3(a). Assumption 1 implies pis2 < p
in
2 . Since p1 + sb =
p2, we find p
is
τ < p
in
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}.
6. Substituting the first-order condition for pin2 , i.e., φ2(p2) + cD2|2 (p2) = 0, into the left-hand
side of the first-order condition for pnn2 , i.e., φ2(p2) = 0, yields −cDin2|2 ≥ 0, where the equality
holds if and only if c = 0. Assumption 1 implies pin2 ≤ pnn2 . Since p1+sb = p2, we find pinτ ≤ pnnτ ,
τ ∈ {1, 2}, where the equality holds if and only if c = 0.
To show the results in point (iii) of the proposition, we substitute the first-order condition
for pns1 in (9) into the left-hand side of the first-order condition for p
is
1 in (12), which yields after
some manipulation
sp
[
Dns2|1 + (p
ns
1 + sb)D
ns
2|11
]
− sbcDns2|11 . (14)
The sign of (14) is negative if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(a) Dns2|11 ≤ 0 and sp >
sbcD
ns
2|11
Dns
2|1+(p
ns
1 +sb)Dns2|11
≡ ŝp, where ŝp ≥ 0;
(b) 0 < Dns2|11 < −
Dns
2|1
pns1 +sb
≡ D̂2|11 ;
(c) Dns2|11 ≥ D̂2|11 and sp < ŝp.
Assumption 1 implies that under one of these conditions we have pis1 < p
ns
1 , which yields
pisτ < p
ns
τ , τ ∈ {1, 2}, since p1 + sb = p2.
Supplementary Appendix
This Supplementary Appendix formalizes the results with linear demand in Section 6 and col-
lects the associated proofs. We assume c > sb > sp ≥ 0, which allows us to focus on the most
plausible parameter constellations and limits the number of case distinctions. The following
remark formalizes the results for c ≥ c˜, where c˜ ≡ α2−α1−2sb−sp2 . The threshold values for sp
are derived in the proof.
Remark 1 Suppose c ≥ c˜. Then, the limited commitment equilibrium exhibits the following
features.
A. For sb <
α2−α1
4 ,
(A1) if sp ≤ sp1, then I∗ = α2 − p∗2, D∗s = 0, and p∗1 = α1+α2+2(c−sb)+sp4 , p∗2 = p∗1 + sb;
(A2) if sp > sp1, then I
ns = 0, Dnss = α2+c−2sb−2pns1 , and pns1 = α1+α2+2c4 , pns2 = pns1 +sb.
B. For sb ≥ α2−α14 ,
(B1) if sp ≤ sp2, then (A1) applies;
(B2) if sp > sp2, then I
nn = Dnns = 0, and p
nn
1 = p
nn
2 − sb, pnn2 = pm2 = α2+c2 .
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Proof of Remark 1. It follows from the proof of Lemma 2 that the producer’s maximization
problem in the absence of inventories is given by
max
p1
(p1 − c) [α1 − p1 +Ds (p1)] + (p1 + sb − c) [α2 − p1 − sb −Ds (p1)] .
Using the second period first-order condition p2 =
α2−Ds(p1)+c
2 and p2 = p1 +sb yields Ds (p1) =
max {α2 + c− 2sb − 2p1, 0}. Suppose first Ds (p1) > 0. Then, substituting Ds (p1) into the pro-
ducer’s maximization problem and taking the first-order condition for p1 yields p
ns
1 =
α1+α2+2c
4
and pns2 = p
ns
1 + sb. Moreover, I
ns = 0 and Dnss = α2 + c− 2sb − 2pns1 = α2−α1−4sb2 . Associated
profits are
Πns =
(α1 + α2 − 2c)2
8
+ s2b . (15)
If α2 − α1 − 4sb ≤ 0, then Inn = Dnns = 0, with prices pnn1 = pnn2 − sb and pnn2 = pm2 = α2+c2 .
Associated profits are
Πnn =
(α1 − c) (α2 − c) + 2 (α2 − α1) sb − 2s2b
2
. (16)
It follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that the producer’s maximization problem in the
presence of inventories is given by
max
p1
(p1 − c) (α1 − p1) + (p1 + sb − c− sp) (α2 − p1 − sb) ,
which yields p∗1 =
α1+α2+2(c−sb)+sp
4 and p
∗
2 = p
∗
1+sb. Moreover, I
∗ = α2−p∗2 = 3α2−α1−2(c+sb)−sp4
and D∗s = 0. Associated profits are
Π∗ =
(α1 + α2)
2 − 4α2 (c− sb)− 4α1 (c+ sb) + 4
(
c2 − s2b
)
8
+
2α1 − 6α2 + 4 (c+ sb) + sp
8
sp.
(17)
The last step is to compare the producer’s profits in each case. We obtain the following
results.
A. For sb <
α2−α1
4 , equilibrium profits are max {Πns,Π∗}. Using (15) and (17) yields Πns ≤
Π∗ ⇔ sp ≤ sp1 , where sp1 ≡ 3α2−α1−2 (c+ sb)−
√
(3α2 − α1 − 2c)2 − 8 (2α2 − α1 − c− 2sb) sb.
B. For sb ≥ α2−α14 , equilibrium profits are max {Πnn,Π∗}. Using (16) and (17) yields Πnn ≤
Π∗ ⇔ sp ≤ sp2 , where sp2 ≡ 3α2 − α1 − 2 (c+ sb)− 2
√
(α2 − c) (2α2 − α1 − c− 2sb).
Differentiating sp1 and sp2 with respect to c yields
∂sp1
∂c =
2(3α2−α1−2c−2sb)√
(3α2−α1−2c)2−8(2α2−α1−c−2sb)sb
−
2 > 0 and
∂sp2
∂c =
3α2−α1−2c−2sb√
(α2−c)(2α2−α1−c−2sb)
− 2 > 0, where the inequalities follow from the assump-
tions on the parameters of the model.
The following remark formalizes the results for c < c˜. The threshold values for sp are derived
in the proof.
Remark 2 Suppose c < c˜. Then, the limited commitment equilibrium exhibits the following
features.
A. For sb ≤ α2−α1−2c4 ,
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(A1) if sp ≤ sp3, then Iis = α2 − pis2 −Diss , Diss = α2 − 2sb − 2pis1 , and pis1 = α1+α2+2c−sp4 ,
pis2 = p
is
1 + sb;
(A2) if sp > sp3, then I
ns = 0, Dnss = α2+c−2sb−2pns1 , and pns1 = α1+α2+2c4 , pns2 = pns1 +sb.
B. For α2−α1−2c4 < sb <
α2−α1
4 ,
(B1) if sp ≤ min {sp4 , sp5}, then Iin = α2−pin2 , Dins = 0, and pin1 = pin2 −sb, pin2 = pm2 |c=0 =
α2
2 ;
(B2) if min {sp4 , sp5} = sp4 and sp4 < sp ≤ sp3, then (A1) applies;
(B3) otherwise, (A2) applies.
C. For sb ≥ α2−α14 , then Inn = Dnns = 0, and pnn1 = pnn2 − sb, pnn2 = pm2 = α2+c2 .
Proof of Remark 2. It follows from the proof of Lemma 3 that the producer’s maximization
problem in the presence of inventories is given by
max
p1
(p1 − c) [α1 − p1 +Ds (p1)] + (p1 + sb − c− sp) [α2 − p1 − sb −Ds (p1)] .
Using the second period first-order condition p2 =
α2−Ds(p1)
2 and p2 = p1 + sb yields Ds (p1) =
max {α2 − 2sb − 2p1, 0}. Suppose first Ds (p1) > 0. Then, substituting Ds (p1) into the pro-
ducer’s maximization problem and taking the first-order condition for p1 yields p
is
1 =
α1+α2+2c−sp
4
and pis2 = p
is
1 +sb. Moreover, I
is = α2−pis2 −Diss = α1+α2+2c+4sb−sp4 and Diss = α2−α1−4sb−2c+sp2 .
Associated profits are
Πis =
(α1 + α2)
2 − 4c (α1 + α2) + 8sb (c+ sb) + 4c2
8
− 2α1 + 2α2 + 4c+ 8sb − sp
8
sp. (18)
If α2−α1− 4sb− 2c+ sp ≤ 0, then Iin = α2− pin2 = α22 and Dins = 0, with prices pin1 = pin2 − sb
and pin2 = p
m
2 |c=0 = α22 . Associated profits are
Πin =
α1α2 − 2α1 (c+ sb) + 2sb (α2 − c− sb)− α2sp
2
. (19)
The last step is to compare the producer’s profits. We obtain the following results.
A. For sb ≤ α2−α1−2c4 , equilibrium profits are max
{
Πns,Πis
}
. Using (15) and (18) yields
Πns ≤ Πis ⇔ sp ≤ sp3 , where sp3 ≡ α1 + α2 + 2c+ 4sb −
√
(α1 + α2 + 2c+ 4sb)
2 − 8sbc.
B. For α2−α1−2c4 < sb <
α2−α1
4 ,
(i) if sp ≤ sp4 , where sp4 ≡ α1 − α2 + 4sb + 2c, equilibrium profits are max
{
Πns,Πin
}
. Using
(15) and (19) yields Πns ≤ Πin ⇔ sp ≤ min {sp4 , sp5}, where sp5 ≡ 8sb(α2−α1−c−2sb)−(α2−α1−2c)
2
4α2
;
(ii) if sp > sp4 , equilibrium profits are max
{
Πns,Πis
}
. It follows from (15) and (18) that
Πns ≤ Πis ⇔ sp4 < sp ≤ sp3 and min {sp4 , sp5} = sp4 . It holds min {sp4 , sp5} = sp4 ⇔
α2 >
α1+2c+4sb+2
√
(α1+2c)
2+2(4α1+5c)sb+16s
2
b
3 ;
C. For sb ≥ α2−α14 , equilibrium profits are Πnn in (16).
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